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Abstract 
The ability to make voluntary, free choices is fundamental to what it means to be human. A key brain 
region that is involved in free choices is the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), which is part of the medial 
frontal cortex. Previous research has shown that activity in this brain region can be modulated by 
bottom-up information while making free choices. The current study extends those findings, and 
shows, for the first time, that activation in the RCZ can also be modulated by subliminal information. 
We used a subliminal response priming paradigm to bias free and cued choices. We observed more 
activation in the RCZ when participants made a choice that went against the prime’s suggestion, 
compared to when they chose according to the prime. This shows that the RCZ plays an important 
role in overcoming externally-triggered conflict between different response options, even when the 
stimuli triggering this conflict are not consciously perceived. Our results suggest that an important 
mechanism of endogenous action in the RCZ may therefore involve exerting an internally-generated 
action choice against conflicting influences, such as external sensory evidence. We further found that 
subliminal information also modulated activity in the anterior insula and the supramarginal gyrus.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Making choices is a complex process. Every day we face an uncountable number of choices. Usually 
these are relatively unimportant: such as what to have for breakfast or what to wear to work. 
Nevertheless, every now and then we are faced with larger and more significant choices: such as 
where to live or what career to pursue. Being able to make such voluntary, or free, choices is 
fundamental for what it means to be human. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the question of how 
voluntary choices are established in the brain has fascinated researchers ever since the beginning of 
scientific psychology (James, 1892). In more recent years, much research has aimed to uncover the 
functional neuroanatomy of free choices, typically by comparing them with forced, or cued, choices 
(Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; Demanet, De Baene, Arrington, & Brass, 2013; Orr & 
Banich, 2014). A consistent finding is that the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), part of the medial frontal 
cortex and extending posteriorly and dorsally from the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), was 
consistently found to play a role in making voluntary choices. This region was interpreted as being 
important for choosing between different alternatives (Forstmann et al., 2006; Demanet et al., 2013; 
Brass and Haggard, 2008; Cunnington, Windischberger, Robinson, & Moser, 2006; De Baene, Albers, 
& Brass, 2012; Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004; Mueller, Brass, Waszak, & Prinz, 2007; van 
Eimeren et al., 2006; Venkatraman, Rosati, Taren, & Huettel, 2009; Walton, Devlin, & Rushworth, 
2004). Besides the RCZ, making voluntary choices has also been associated with activation in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior insula (AI), pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), 
SMA-proper, inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and frontopolar cortex (FPC) (Forstmann et al., 2006; 
Demanet et al., 2013; Orr & Banich, 2014). These regions form a “choice network” that is part of a 
larger voluntary action network (Spence, Hunter, & Harpin, 2002; Brass & Haggard, 2008; 2010; 
Brass, Lynn, Demanet, & Rigoni, 2013; Krieghoff, Waszak, Prinz & Brass, 2011; Lau, Rogers, & 
Passingham, 2006). Another current research line focusses on whether or not voluntary choices are 
truly ‘free’ (Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983; Libet, 1985; 1999; 
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Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013). Intuitively one would think 
that free choices are mostly determined by our own intentions and internal goals. Previous research, 
however, suggests that free choices may not be as free as they seem to be, and are strongly 
influenced by cues from the environment or past experiences (Bargh et al., 2001; Arrington & Logan, 
2005; Arrington, Weaver & Pauker, 2010; Wenke, Fleming & Haggard, 2010; Orr & Weissman, 2011; 
Orr, Carp, & Weissman, 2012; Demanet et al., 2013; Orr & Banich, 2014). Wenke and colleagues 
(2010), for example, found that subliminal primes influence the responses on free choice trials in 
such a way that people responded significantly more slowly when they chose to act against the prime 
(in a prime-incompatible way). Participants were also significantly more likely to choose to follow the 
prime’s suggestion (in a prime-compatible way), than go against the prime. Brain activity in the RCZ 
and the AI was reported to be reduced when a free choice is biased by supraliminal external 
information (Demanet et al., 2013; Orr & Banich, 2014). This research shows that some parts of the 
‘choice network’ may be influenced by information that primes free choices. Previous studies, 
however, did not test whether a modulation of the choice network was also found when participants 
are completely unaware of the biasing information. In the present study we try to extend these 
findings by investigating how subliminally presented information might influence activation in the 
choice network with a particular focus on RCZ. The experimental paradigm was based on that of 
Vorberg et al. (2003). In the original paradigm, choices are always explicitly cued, in the sense that 
participants have to respond either with the right or the left hand to right or left pointing target 
arrows respectively. Before the target arrows, prime arrows are subliminally presented resulting in 
slower response times and more errors on incompatible trials, when the direction of the prime goes 
against the direction of the target (Vorberg et al., 2003). For the current study we adapted the 
paradigm following Wenke et al. (2010). In this adapted paradigm, participants additionally perform 
random trials on which they must freely choose between two response alternatives, without any cue 
indicating one over the other. In addition to the classic directional primes, we also included neutral 
primes, so as to distinguish costs of incompatible priming from benefits of compatible priming. Cued 
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choice trials and free choice trials were intermixed. The participant was asked to respond in a 
balanced and spontaneous way on free choice trials (Arrington & Logan, 2005; Demanet et al., 2013). 
Our main interest lay in contrasting cued choices with free choices. We predicted activation in the 
choice network, especially in the RCZ, for free choices over and above that for forced choices. We 
further investigated whether subliminal external information can have an effect on the involvement 
of these regions while making free and cued choices. First, we predicted that subliminal primes 
would affect the intentional choice network, with less activation when a prime-compatible choice is 
made (i.e. in the same direction as the prime) compared to prime-incompatible choice (i.e. against 
the direction of the prime). Furthermore, by using neutral primes we could test whether such a 
compatibility effect is driven by a facilitation effect in compatible trials or an interference effect in 
incompatible trials. Finally, we wanted to test whether such a modulation of the choice network is 
different for the free choice condition compared to the forced choice condition.  
2. Method Section 
2.1 Participants 
Participants in this study were 30 Dutch-speaking students at Ghent University (20 female, mean age 
= 22.37 years, SD = 4.21); each reported as healthy and with no history of neurological, pain, or 
circulatory disorders and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave written 
informed consent, and the study was approved by the Medical Ethical Review Board of the Ghent 
University hospital, in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. All participants were right-handed, 
as assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), and were compensated thirty-five euros for 
their participation.  
2.2 Stimuli  
Stimulus presentation and response registration was done using Tscope software (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). In the scanner room the task was presented 
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using a Brainlogics 200MR digital projector that uses digital light processing (DLP) running at a refresh 
rate of 60 Hz with a viewing distance of 120 cm. Using DLP it only took 1 ms to deconstruct the image 
on the screen allowing our subliminal primes to be presented with greater accuracy. The duration of 
the primes was specified in ms. To make sure the primes were shown for only one refresh rate the 
duration of the primes was set to 10 ms. We logged the actual time the prime appeared on the 
screen for each trial. The mean presentation time was 17.94ms (sd = 0.28). The response priming 
task was adapted from Chambon (Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2012). Three types 
of primes were used: grey coloured left or right pointing arrows or a neutral prime (which consisted 
of overlapping left and right pointing arrows). The primes were followed by superimposed by 
metacontrast masks of the same luminance (see Fig. 1). The metacontrast masks were embedded 
within target arrows that pointed left or right in cued-choice trials, or in both directions 
simultaneously in free-choice trials. Primes subtended visual angles of 0.8° x 1.86°, and the targets of 
1.09° x 3.47° (Vorberg et al., 2003). Prime and target stimuli could appear randomly above or below a 
fixation cross at a visual angle of 1.38°.  The unpredictable location was reported to enhance the 
masking effect (Vorberg et al., 2003).  
2.3 Procedure 
The priming procedure was similar to that used by Chambon et al. (2012) (figure 1). Participants were 
instructed to respond to the direction of the target arrows with their right and left index fingers using 
an MR compatible response box. On free-choice trials participants were encouraged to perform each 
action roughly equally often and not to use a fixed response strategy, such as alternating between 
responses. Examples of each target stimulus were presented before the experiment during 
instructions so that participants would be familiar with the targets before the experiment started for 
familiarization purposes. Participants were never alerted to the possibility of primes being presented, 
or influencing their behaviour. Primes were presented for 16.7 ms, followed by mask appearing with 
a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 33 ms. Target (and mask) duration was 250 ms. The response 
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window was set to 1500 ms. If participants failed to respond within this time window, they saw “te 
laat” (too late) for 1000 ms after the trial. The inter-trial-interval was jittered with values ranging 
between 1000ms and 5250ms. The distribution of the jitter values followed a distribution with 
pseudo-logarithmic density (range, 1000–5250 ms, in steps of 250 ms; mean jitter, 2625 ms). The 
task consisted of six blocks of 144 trials each. Cued- and free-choice trials were randomly intermixed 
within each block at a 50/50 ratio. In each block, half of the cued-choice trials were prime-response 
compatible and the other half were prime-response incompatible. For prime-response compatible 
trials, the direction of the prime was the same as the direction of the mask.  In incompatible cued-
choice trials, the response was again in the same direction of the mask, but in the opposite direction 
of the prime. In free-choice trials, compatibility was defined by the response of the participant, 
because on these trials there was no unambiguously ‘‘correct” response. Responses were labeled as 
prime-compatible when participants ‘‘freely” chose a response in the same direction as the prime, 
and incompatible when their response went against the direction of the prime.  Thus, the meaning 
relation between prime and motor response was similar for compatible free-choice trials and for 
(correct) compatible forced choice trials (and ditto for incompatible trials).   After the task 
participants were asked whether they noticed anything unusual about the stimuli during the task. 
None of the participants noticed the primes, but two participants reported seeing a “flash” before 
the target was presented. Following the test phase, participants were explicitly told about the 
presence primes, and performed a prime-visibility test. This test allowed us to check if the prime 
stimuli were indeed presented subliminally, or not. The prime-visibility test was similar to the one 
used by Wenke et al. (2010). In this test participants were asked to identify the direction of the 
primes (left or right) on each individual trial by using the same left and right response buttons as 
used during the test phase. This prime-visibility test was as similar as possible to the main response 
priming experiment. During this test, participants remained in the scanner, so environment and 
apparatus were identical to the main experiment. To minimize indirect priming effects on the 
recognition of the primes, participants were required to respond at least 600 ms after the mask was 
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presented. This also optimizes the conditions for recognition performance as speed stress could lead 
to reduced response accuracy (Vorberg et al., 2003).  A visual cue (‘*’) signaled when they were 
allowed to respond. The test consisted of two blocks of 50 trials each. The responses to the primes 
were categorized using signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966).  Measures of prime 
discriminability (d’) for each participant were analysed. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of trial procedure and stimuli, adapted from Wenke et al. (2010). Three example trials from 
the possible combinations of the factors choice type (cued: left and middle panel; free: right panel) and prime-
action compatibility (compatible: left panel; neutral: middle panel; incompatible: right panel). In each example, 
the participant responded with the left hand. Participants were instructed to respond to the target stimuli, and 
were unaware of the presence of the arrow primes. Primes and targets could appear randomly above or below 
fixation on each trial.  
 
2.4 fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
Data were acquired with a 3T Siemens Magnetom Trio MRI system (Siemens Medical Systems, 
Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel radiofrequency head coil. Participants were positioned 
headfirst and supine in the magnet bore. First, 176 high-resolution anatomical images were acquired 
using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (TR = 2,250 ms, TE = 4.18 ms, TI = 900 ms, image matrix = 
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256 x 256, FOV = 256 mm, flip angle = 9°, and voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm). Whole-brain functional 
images were then collected using a T2-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence, sensitive to 
blood-oxygen-level dependent contrast (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 35 ms, image matrix = 64 x 64, FOV = 
224 mm, flip angle = 80°, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size 3.5 x 3.5 x 3.0 
mm, and 30 axial slices). A varying number of images were acquired per run due to individual 
differences in choice behavior and reaction times. All data were preprocessed and analyzed using 
Matlab and the SPM8 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). To 
account for possible T1 relaxation effects, the first four scans of each EPI series were excluded from 
the analysis. The ArtRepair toolbox for SPM was used to detect outlier volumes concerning global 
intensity or large scan-to-scan movement (Mazaika, Whitfield-Gabrieli, & Reiss, 2007). First, a mean 
image for all scan volumes was created, to which individual volumes were spatially realigned using 
rigid body transformation. Thereafter, they were slice time corrected using the first slice as a 
reference. The structural image of each participant was coregistered with their mean functional 
image after which all functional images were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute 
(Montreal, Quebec, Canada) T1 template. Motion parameters were estimated for each session 
separately. The images were resampled into 3 x 3 x 3 mm voxels and spatially smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half maximum). A high-pass filter of 128 Hz was applied during 
fMRI data analysis. 
2.5 Behavioral Data Analysis 
Mean reaction times (RTs) and error rates were submitted to a 2 X 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, 
with factors of choice type (cued vs. free) and prime-response compatibility (compatible vs. 
incompatible vs. neutral). We also analyzed response bias in free-choice trials. The response bias is 
expressed as the percentage of free-choice responses that were prime-compatible.  
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2.6 General GLM analyses 
The participant-level statistical analyses were performed using the general linear model (GLM). 
Based on the 2x3 design of the response priming task (choice = cued/free x prime = 
compatible/incompatible/neutral), six different regressors of interest were modelled. For both the 
cued-choice and free-choice conditions compatible, incompatible and neutral trials were modelled 
separately. Erroneous trials and the first trials of each block were modeled as separate regressors of 
no interest (3.6% of the trials). For this analysis, the events of interest were the periods after the 
onsets of the different targets in the response priming task. Vectors containing the event onsets 
were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) to form the main 
regressors in the design matrix (the regression model). Motion parameters for each individual 
subject were added. No derivatives were added to the HRF for this analysis. The statistical parameter 
estimates were computed separately for each voxel for all columns in the design matrix. Contrast 
images were constructed for each individual to compare the relevant parameter estimates for the 
regressors containing the canonical HRF. The group-level random effects analysis was then 
performed. Flexible factorial tests (Ashburner et al., 2010) were performed for each voxel of the 
contrast image. At the whole brain level, we only contrasted free-choice trials with cued-choice trials. 
This comparison was carried out to reveal the voluntary choice network, i.e. brain areas that were 
activated more during free-choice trials than during cued-choice trials. Only clusters significant at the 
familywise peak-level threshold of p < .05 are reported (initial voxel level threshold T = 4.75, p < 
.001). The resulting maps were overlaid onto a structural image of a standard MNI brain, and the 
coordinates reported correspond to the MNI coordinate system. 
2.7 Regions of interest analyses 
In the region of interest (ROI) analyses, we focused on the RCZ, as this was our principal ROI based on 
previous studies (Mueller et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2004; Krieghoff et al., 2009; Forstmann et al., 2006; 
Demanet et al., 2013). To create a ROI for the RCZ we averaged the coordinates that were reported 
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by the studies of Mueller et al. (2007), Lau et al. (2004) and Krieghoff et al. (2009) as these studies 
used a design that was similar enough to the design of the current study (Average MNI = [6 19 40], 
current study MNI = [6 20 43]). These studies all contrasted free choices with cued choices (In these 
studies, like in our current study, participants had to make a left or right response either freely or to 
external cues), as we did in our current study. Two of these studies reported coordinates in Talairach 
space, we converted these coordinates to MNI coordinates in MatLab using the tal2mni function 
(http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach; Duncan et al., 2000; Calder, Lawrence, & 
Young, 2001).   Besides the RCZ we also looked at other brain regions that showed significant 
activation in whole brain analysis, and that are known to be part of the choice network. The actual 
ROIs were created using spheres with a 5mm radius around the peak voxels determined by the whole 
brain analysis (table 2). The percent beta change of each ROI was submitted to a 2 X 3 repeated-
measures ANOVA, with factors choice type (cued vs. free) and prime-response compatibility 
(compatible vs. incompatible vs. neutral). When a significant main effect of prime-response 
compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible vs. neutral) was found, the differences between the 
conditions were analyzed post-hoc using two-tailed paired samples t-tests. Note that the 
interpretation of choice type is trivial because the ROIs were based on the main effect of choice type. 
Importantly, the compatibility factor is independent of the choice factor.  Therefore the contrast 
used to define these ROIs is independent of the analysis of interest, thus avoiding concerns about 
“double-dipping” (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009; Kriegeskorte, Lindquist, 
Nichols, Poldrack, & Vul, 2010) for the main effect of compatibility. The interpretation of the 
interaction of compatibility and choice, however, is more problematic, because this analysis is not 
independent of the main effect choice contrast used to define ROIs. This increased the risk of false 
positives, and would make problematic any interaction showing stronger effects of compatibility in 
the free than in the forced conditions. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Behavioral Results 
One participant was excluded because of an error rate of 20% in cued prime-compatible trials and 
35% in the cued prime-incompatible trials. Three more participants were excluded from the analyses 
because their d’ in the prime visibility test was larger than one standard deviation above the mean, 
indicating that unconscious perception could no longer be guaranteed. The remaining 26 (mean age 
22.46 years, SD = 4.48; 19 female) participants that were unaware of the direction of the prime 
stimuli were included in the analysis. The d’ values were not significantly different from zero (mean 
d’ = 0.029 ± 0.21; one-sample t-test, t(26) = 0.70, p = 0.49). Participants failed to respond during the 
1500 ms response window on 1.1% of the trials. For the remaining data, mean reaction times (RT) for 
correct trials were determined as a function of choice type (free, cued) and prime-response 
compatibility (compatible, incompatible or neutral). The reaction times were submitted to a 2 X 3 
repeated-measures ANOVA with choice type (cued and free) and prime-response compatibility 
(prime-response compatible vs. incompatible vs. neutral) as factors. A Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used for tests involving the factor prime-response compatibility, which violated the 
ANOVA assumption of sphericity. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of choice type (F(1, 
25) = 27.06, p < .001) and prime-response compatibility, (F(2, 50) = 84.65, p < .001). The significant 
main effect of choice type indicates that responses in the cued-choice condition were faster 
compared to the free-choice condition (free-cued= 17ms). The results (table 1) show a significant 
compatibility effect, such that prime-compatible responses were significantly faster (t(25) = 10.27, p 
< .001, d = 0.41) compared to prime-incompatible responses (incompatible – compatible= 27ms). 
Overall, directional primes led to a significant facilitation effect, such that prime-compatible 
responses were faster (t(25) = 4.74, p < .001, d = 0.10) than prime-neutral responses (neutral – 
compatible= 7ms); as well as a significant interference effect, with slower prime-incompatible 
responses (t(25) = -9.17, p < .001, d = 0.32) than prime-neutral responses (incompatible – neutral= 
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20ms). The interaction between choice type and prime-response compatibility was significant (F(2, 
50) = 14.58, p < .001), indicating that for cued-choice trials the compatibility effect was smaller 
compared to free-choice trials (cued incompatible – cued compatible= 21ms, t(25) = 9.24, p < .001, d 
= 0.33; free incompatible – free compatible= 31ms, t(25) = 9.07, p < .001, d = 0.45). The same holds 
for the interference effect (cued incompatible – cued neutral= 11ms, t(25) = 5.53, p < .001, d = 0.15; 
free incompatible – free neutral= 27ms, t(25) = 8.87, p < .001, d = 0.40). Conversely, the facilitation 
effect was smaller in the free-choice trials, compared to cue-choice (cued compatible – cued neutral= 
10ms, t(25) = -5.57, p < .001, d = 0.18; free compatible – free neutral= 4ms, t(25) = -1.97, p = .060, d = 
0.05).  
In the free-choice condition we also looked at how the primes biased the choices participants 
made. The response bias was defined as the percentage of trials in which participants’ chose the 
prime-compatible as opposed to the prime-incompatible response. Participants chose the prime-
compatible response option significantly more often (56.2%) than would be expected by chance, 
t(25) = 5.51, p < .001. The response bias also correlated positively (r = .554, p < .01) with the 
compatibility effect (on the reaction times) in the cued-choice condition (cued incompatible – cued 
compatible reaction times). This showed that more bias by the prime in free-choice trials (i.e. 
choosing more prime-compatible responses) was associated with greater interference by the prime, 
resulting in a larger compatibility effect, in cued-choice trials. The free-choice compatibility effect 
was not significantly correlated with the response bias, but it did show a significant positive 
correlation with the cued-choice compatibility effect (r = .518, p < .01). Looking at the error rates 
within the cued-choice condition, participants made significantly more errors (t(25) = 4.57, p < 0.001, 
d = 0.77) on prime-incompatible trials (7.84%) than on prime-compatible trials (3.82%).  
To make sure participants did not use predetermined response strategies we looked at 
sequential dependencies between trials in the free-choice condition. We specifically looked at the 
free choice trials because the responses in the cued-choice condition are fixed, whereas in the free-
choice condition participants have more opportunity to deviate from the instructions not to use 
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predetermined strategies. We compared the responses in the current free-choice trial (trial n) with 
those in the previous trial (trial n-1, which could either be a cued-choice trial or another free-choice 
trial) to see whether participants have a tendency to systematically respond either the same or the 
opposite in trial n as in trial n-1. We calculated the proportion of trials in which they made a switch to 
another response (from the left to the right hand or vice versa). Participants seem to have a 
tendency to switch to the other response rather than repeat the previous one (mean proportion of 
switches in free trials, m = 0.57). This finding is in line with previous research on the production of 
random response sequences (e.g. Nickerson, 2002). A frequently reported finding from studies that 
have looked into the concept of randomness is that participants, when asked to generate random 
binary sequences, have a tendency to produce sequences that consist of slightly more alternations 
than would be expected by chance (Nickerson, 2002). This is exactly what we observed in the current 
study, further supporting our conclusion that participants have been responding in a random way to 
the best of their abilities. The analysis also shows that participants are not more likely to switch when 
trial n-1 was a cued-choice trial (m = 0.58) compared to when it was a free-choice trial (m = 0.57, 
paired samples t(25) = 0.67, p = .50).  
We also tested whether the instruction to respond as random as possible while using an 
equal amount of left and right responses might have interacted with the subliminal priming effect by 
introducing a constraint on the freedom of the choices. If the instruction to be random would 
interfere with the task then it is likely that participants would keep track of this random sequence 
during the task. This would imply that their choice would be more restricted towards the end of the 
block compared to the beginning and that the subliminal primes would become less effective. Hence, 
one would expect a reduction of the priming effect towards the end of a block. We carried out a 
linear mixed models analysis on the behavioral data to examine whether or not there was a 
reduction of the priming effect over the course of a block. In the analysis reaction time was the 
dependent variable and choice and compatibility were the predicting factors. Trial number was then 
added as a continuous predictor so we could look at the effect of compatibility over the course of a 
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block. We did not find a significant two-way interaction between trial number and compatibility (F(2, 
21297.3) = .203, p = .817) nor did we find a significant three-way interaction between trial number, 
choice and compatibility (F(2, 21304) = .075, p = .927). This shows that the priming effect does not 
change over the course of a block thus suggesting that the instructions seem to have no or only a 
minimal impact on the choice process. 
 
Table 1.  
 Reaction time (ms) % errors 
Choice type: Cued Choice   
Compatible 426.8  (12.3) 3.82 
Incompatible 448.3 (11.3) 7.84 
Difference 21.5 
 
4.02 
 
 
 Reaction time (ms) % Responses 
Choice type: Free Choice   
Compatible 441.9 (14.1) 56.2 
Incompatible 473.4 (13.4) 43.8 
Difference 31.5  
   
Cued Neutral 436.5 (11.3)  
Free Neutral 446.2 (13.6)  
Difference 9.7  
Reaction times and percentage of errors as a function of choice type and prime-action compatibility. 
Note: numbers in parentheses show standard errors of the means across participants  
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3.2 fMRI 
3.2.1 Whole-Brain Analysis Results 
In this analysis we focused on the brain regions that showed significant activity when contrasting 
free-choice related activity with cued-choice related activity. This way we wanted to identify which 
brain regions were involved in making free-choices. Several clusters were revealed that were 
activated more (family wise error (FWE) corrected) during free-choice trials compared to cued-choice 
trials (Table 2). In particular, we found a large cluster of activity of this kind in the rostral cingulate 
zone (RCZ). While the peak coordinates of this cluster (MNI 6 20 43) were in the right RCZ, this cluster 
also overlapped with peak coordinates reported in previous studies comparing free-choices and 
cued-choices (Mueller et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2004; Krieghoff et al., 2009; Forstmann et al., 2006; 
Demanet et al., 2013; Orr & Banich, 2014). We also found active clusters in the left anterior insula 
(AI; MNI -36 20 -2), left supramarginal gyrus (SG; MNI -48 -40 46), right SG (MNI 45 -37 40), right pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA; MNI 18 14 58), left pre-SMA (MNI -24 5 64), left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; MNI -48 14 34) and the right DLPFC (MNI 51 14 28). Even though we were 
not primarily interested in looking at the interaction between choice and prime-compatibility at the 
whole brain level we did carried out the analysis for completeness but were unable to find any 
significant whole brain activation. Neither did we find significant whole brain activation when 
contrasting compatible versus incompatible choices.  
  
Table 2.  
Region Peak Coordinates (MNI) z-score Extent 
Free-choice > Cued-choice    
Right rostral cingulate zone 6 20 43 7.10 161 
Left supramarginal gyrus -48 -40 46 7.02 398 
Right supramarginal gyrus 45 -37 40 6.79 339 
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Right pre-SMA 18 14 58 6.17 126 
Left pre-SMA -24 5 64 5.31 15 
Left anterior insula -36 20 -2 5.14 28 
Left DLPFC -48 14 34 5.13 34 
Right DLPFC 51 14 28 4.95 12 
Active regions on whole-brain level revealed by contrasting free-choice trials with cued-choice trials  
(cluster-level threshold P < .05, family-wise error correction, initial voxel level threshold T = 4.75, p < .001).  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Region of Interest (ROI) Analysis Results 
In order to investigate how subliminal primes influenced activity in the choice network, and 
particularly in the RCZ, we carried out two region of interest analyses, using an ROI that was based on 
previous studies that contrasted free choices with cued choices and one that was based on the whole 
brain contrast of free versus cued choice. In the independent ROI analysis a 2x3 repeated-measures 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect for prime-compatibility (F(2, 24) = 4.07, p = .030). There was 
no significant interaction between choice and prime-response compatibility. This region was more 
strongly activated in the incompatible prime-response condition compared to the compatible 
condition (t(25) = -2.59, p = .016, d = .36) and the neutral condition (t(25) = 2.49, p = .020, d = .39). 
The compatible and the neutral conditions did not differ in activation (t(25) = -0.07, p = .95, d = .01). 
In the second ROI analysis, we looked at the active clusters that were found in the contrast of free 
choices compared to cued choices during the whole-brain analysis. Here we were primarily 
interested in the influence of prime-response compatibility, given that the ROIs were selected on the 
basis of the main effect of choice type. A 2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA (choice x prime-
compatibility) revealed a significant main effect of prime-response compatibility in the right RCZ (F(2, 
50) = 4.87, p = .012). The RCZ showed an activation pattern consistent with a response-conflict 
interpretation. This region was more strongly activated in the incompatible prime-response condition 
compared to the compatible condition (t(25) = -3.01, p = .006, d = .56) and the neutral condition 
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(t(25) = 2.47, p = .020, d = .52). The compatible and the neutral conditions did not differ in activation 
(t(25) = -0.17, p = .87, d = .02).  
Looking at the whole-brain level analysis, several other regions were significantly more 
activated during free-choice trials, compared to cued-choice trials. These regions were the left AI, left 
and right pre-SMA, the left and right DLPFC and the left and right SG. Before looking at the patterns 
of activation in each ROI separately we carried out a 2x3x8 repeated-measures ANOVA (choice x 
prime-compatibility x ROI) thus including ROI as a factor. We observed significant main effects for 
ROI (F(7, 19) = 4.08, p = .007) and compatibility (F(2, 24) = 4.51, p = .022) as well as a significant 
interaction between ROI and compatibility (F(14, 12) = 4.14, p = .009). This allowed for planned 
comparisons within each ROI to look at the main effect of prime-compatibility. We performed 
separate 3x2 repeated-measures ANOVA’s for each ROI. Here we observed a significant main effect 
of prime-response compatibility in the left AI (F(2, 24) = 3.92, p = .026), the left SG (F(2, 39.9) = 4.40, 
p = .017) and the right SG (F(2, 50) = 4.36, p = .018). We did not find a main effect for prime-response 
compatibility in the left (F(2, 50) = 0.33, p = .72) and right DLPFC (F(2, 50) = 2.72, p = .09) and in the 
left (F(2, 50) = 1.14, p = .32) and right pre-SMA (F(2, 50) = 2.47, p = .11). For the left SG a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used for the factor prime-response compatibility, which violated the ANOVA 
assumption of sphericity. In the left AI and the left SG we observed a similar response conflict pattern 
as in the RCZ. There was marginally more activation in the incompatible prime-response condition 
compared to the compatible condition (left AI: t(25) = -2.00, p = .056, d = .20; left SG: t(25) = -2.06, p 
= .050, d = .18), and significantly more than in the neutral condition (left AI: t(25) = 2.59, p = .016 d = 
.25; left SG: t(25) = 2.77, p = .010, d = .16). The compatible and the neutral conditions did not differ in 
activation (left AI: t(25) = 0.50, p = .62, d = .05; left  SG: t(25) = 0.16, p = .87, d = .01). In the right SG 
the incompatible condition differed significantly from the neutral condition (right SG: t(25) = 2.49, p = 
.020, d = .20), and marginally from the compatible condition (right SG: t(25) = -1.90, p = .069, d = .14). 
As in the other ROI’s, the compatible and the neutral conditions did not differ in activation (right SG: 
t(25) = 1.30, p = .205, d = .01). These results indicate that, compared to neutral and compatible trials, 
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the RCZ, the left AI and the left and right SG were engaged more during incompatible trials. This 
suggests that these regions are involved in detecting and/or resolving response conflict induced by 
the subliminal primes. The fact that we found no significant main effects of prime-response 
compatibility in the left and right pre-SMA and in the left and right DLPFC implies that at least in the 
current study the pre-SMA and the DLPFC were not directly involved in resolving conflict due to an 
external, subliminal bias.  
Finally, out of the eight ROI’s that were created, only one ROI (right SG) showed a marginally 
significant interaction between choice type and prime-response compatibility (F(2, 24) = 3.13, p = 
.062). Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests were carried out to investigate how the prime-response 
compatibility conditions differed from each other within the free-choice and the cued-choice 
conditions. We observed a significant difference between the free-choice compatible and 
incompatible prime-response conditions (See also figure 1; t(25) = -2.10, p = .046, d = .18) and 
between the free-choice incompatible and the neutral conditions (t(25) = 2.56, p = .017 d = .23), but 
not between the free-choice compatible and the neutral conditions (t(25) = 0.46, p = .65, d = .04). No 
significant differences were found between any of the prime-response compatibility conditions 
within the cued-choice condition, indicating that the interaction is driven by the differences between 
the free-choice prime-response incompatible condition with both the prime-response compatible 
and neutral condition. This finding is in line with the behavioral data, where we observed a similar 
interaction pattern (larger difference between prime-response incompatible and compatible free-
choices compared to prime-response incompatible and compatible cued-choices). Of course, it 
should be noted that this interaction has to be interpreted with caution, if it can be interpreted at all. 
First of all it is only marginally significant. Secondly, interpretation is problematic because the 
selection of the ROIs is based on one factor of the interaction, namely choice type. Nevertheless, we 
thought it worthwhile to report it for completeness. Overall, our findings indicate that although we 
do find free-choice related brain activation in several areas that are related to voluntary action, for 
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both the cued-choice and free-choice conditions these areas appear to be similarly influenced by the 
primes. This indicates that similar processes could be involved in both choice conditions.   
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Figure 2. Areas that show a significant conflict activation pattern (incompatible significantly higher than compatible or 
neutral) on the whole brain level when contrasting free-choice related activation with cued-choice activation. The Y-axis 
depicts the beta values from the ROI. The peak-voxel coordinates used to define 5mm spherical ROI’s are given in table 2. 
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Figure 3. Areas that do not show a significant conflict activation pattern (incompatible significantly higher than 
compatible or neutral) on the whole brain level when contrasting free-choice related activation with cued-choice activation. 
The Y-axis depicts the beta values from the ROI. The peak-voxel coordinates used to define 5mm spherical ROIs are given in 
table 2. 
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4. Discussion 
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate whether activation in the RCZ, a brain region 
that is part of a voluntary action network, can be influenced by subliminal information while carrying 
out an intentional action. We indeed found that activity in the RCZ, and a number of other brain 
regions associated with voluntary action, was modulated by subliminal primes. We used a free choice 
response priming paradigm (Wenke et al., 2010), in which participants made voluntary choices 
between equivalent alternative actions, while being exposed to subliminal primes. This paradigm 
consisted of intermixed cued-choice and free-choice trials. The behavioral results showed that in 
both cued-choice and free-choice conditions, the subliminal primes had an effect on the behavior of 
participants. Primes that opposed the direction of the response (incompatible prime-response 
condition) generally resulted in slower reaction times (and more errors on cued-choice trials) than 
primes that agreed with the direction of the response (compatible prime-response condition). These 
findings mirror the findings from previous response priming studies (see e.g. Vorberg et al., 2003; 
Wenke et al., 2010). The neutral prime condition lay between the incompatible and compatible 
conditions as regards RT. This suggests that the subliminal primes both interfered with the responses 
on incompatible trials and facilitated responses on the compatible trials. In the free-choice condition, 
participants also chose the prime-compatible response significantly more often than the prime-
incompatible response (56% vs 44% respectively). Furthermore, we found that the primes elicited a 
stronger interference effect in free-choice trials compared to cued-choice, as indicated by the 
significant interaction between the factors choice type and prime-response compatibility on the 
reaction times. Previous studies using this paradigm (see Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Wenke et al., 
2010; O’Connor & Neill, 2011), however, did not find this interaction to be significant. 
When contrasting free-choice related brain activity with cued-choice related brain activity on 
the whole brain level, we found activity in the RCZ, the left AI, the left and right DLPFC, the left and 
right pre-SMA and in the left and right SG (inferior parietal lobe, IPL). These brain areas have 
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previously been related to intentional choice (Demanet et al. 2013; Orr and Banich, 2014; Forstmann 
et al., 2006) and are thought to be part of an intentional action network (Seeley et al., 2007; De 
Pisapi et al., 2012). Hence we succeeded in our first goal of identifying involvement of the RCZ and 
other regions within the intentional choice network.  Our experiment, however, primarily aimed to 
investigate whether subliminal primes can modulate activity in these brain regions. In ROI analyses, 
the RCZ showed a clear conflict activation pattern with more activation for choices that were prime-
incompatible compared to prime-compatible or prime-neutral choices. In the left AI and the left SG 
we observed a significant difference between prime-incompatible and neutral choices and a 
marginally significant difference between prime-compatible and prime-incompatible choices. This 
might be interpreted as a somewhat weaker conflict pattern. These findings indicate that subliminal 
priming indeed modulates brain activity in regions that have previously been linked to voluntary 
action. Interestingly, this pattern was similar for free and cued choices, which suggests that 
incongruent subliminal primes not only induce stronger conflict in free-choice trials, but also in cued-
choice trials. Of course it should be mentioned that this interpretation has to be treated with caution 
due to the fact that, except for the RCZ, the ROI’s were created by contrasting free and cued choices.  
Our findings are in line with previous studies focusing on RCZ (De Pisapia et al., 2011) and AI (De 
Pisapia et al., 2011; Demanet et al., 2013; Orr & Banich, 2014) in resisting external influences. 
Interestingly, Demanet et al. (2013) did not find the RCZ to be more activated during incompatible 
trials compared to neutral and compatible trials. Rather they found a reduction of RCZ in activity 
during compatible trials compared to incompatible and neutral trials, indicating facilitation by the 
external information. This difference might be due to differences in the experimental paradigms. 
Demanet et al. (2013) used a voluntary task switching paradigm, in which participants had the 
opportunity to form associations between the external biasing information and the task. This means 
that, rather than introducing conflict, the external information could be facilitating decision making 
via these previously formed associations. Orr and Banich (2014), in contrast to Demanet et al. (2013), 
also found conflict activation patterns for incompatible trials. Although they also used a voluntary 
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task switching paradigm, they used flanker-style stimuli to introduce external biasing information. 
Similarly to the current study, flanker-style stimuli provide immediate online conflicting information, 
presumably causing the observed conflict activation patterns. We also found free-choice related 
activity in the DLPFC and the pre-SMA, but these regions did not show the conflict activation pattern 
we found in the RCZ, AI and the SG. The DLPFC and the pre-SMA are additional regions that have 
previously been associated with executive control (Cole & Schneider, 2007; Seeley et al., 2007; 
Demanet et al., 2013; Brass et al., 2013; Orr & Banich, 2014), but our findings suggest that they are 
not directly involved in overcoming conflict induced by unconscious primes. A study by Chambon et 
al. (2012) using subliminal response priming did not find the DLPFC to be involved in conflict 
resolution either. Instead, they observed more activation in the DLPFC in prime compatible trials 
compared to prime incompatible trials. While another study did find a conflict resolution pattern (Lau 
and Passingham, 2007), the DLPFC coordinates (MNI: -38, 36, 14) reported do not overlap with those 
reported in the current study (MNI: -48, 14, 34). This indicates that the present task activated a 
different part of the DLPFC, possibly reflecting different processes. Grey-matter density in the pre-
SMA has previously been associated with compatibility effects on action for both supraliminal and 
strongly masked primes (2010). However, prime visibility was significantly above chance level, and a 
very different methodology was used compared to the present study. This again leaves open the 
possibility of different processes being at play in this region. Our results clearly suggest that 
subliminal information can modulate activity in brain regions associated with voluntary choice. We 
found activation in the RCZ and the AI to be associated with conflict induced by the subliminal 
primes. The RCZ has been associated with conflict monitoring before (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, 
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004; Schouppe, 
Demanet, Boehler, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2014). However, our study extends these findings by 
showing that these regions are also sensitive to conflicts triggered by stimuli of which participants 
are completely unaware. It has been shown before that unconscious information can influence 
activity in regions associated with voluntary action (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, 
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Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008). In these previous studies, participants always performed 
externally guided, reactive behaviours, without any free-choice, voluntary component. The current 
study extends these findings to free choices. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to show that 
unconscious information has an impact on brain activity in regions that are involved in making free 
choices. Furthermore, we show that the RCZ and the AI are sensitive to intentional choice mode, and 
also to conflict induced by subliminal primes. Interestingly, we also found a marginally significant 
interaction between choice type and prime-response compatibility in the right SG, indicating that this 
region might be involved more during free choices than during cued choices, mirroring the response 
time pattern. The SG, which is part of the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), has been associated with making 
voluntary choices (Forstmann et al., 2006), and is thought to be part of a fronto-parietal action 
control network (Ruge, Brass, Koch, Rubin, Meiran, & von Cramon, 2005; Forstmann et al., 2006).  As 
stated in the results section, however, this result should be interpreted with caution, because the 
interaction in this particular ROI is not independent of the definition of the ROI. 
Taken together, our results suggest that conflict and choice might be two sides of the same 
coin. Choice necessarily implicates conflict, and conflict necessarily implicates choice. This might also 
explain why we did not find an interaction between choice and prime-compatibility in the RCZ. In 
both cued and free choices conflicting information was present so if the RCZ is mainly involved in 
conflict resolution it makes sense that it would also be involved in overcoming conflict in the cued 
choices. This involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex, of which the RCZ is a part, in both conflict 
and volition has been suggested before by Nachev, Rees, Parton, Kennard, & Husain (2005). 
According to Holroyd and Yeung (2012), the ACC associates outcome values with different response 
options, and chooses the appropriate option for the current environmental state. Via this process the 
ACC thus contributes to making a decision.  It then directs the DLPFC to implement the chosen 
response option. Holroyd and Yeung (2012) also argue that the ACC determines the amount of effort 
invested in a response. Other studies have found more activity in the dACC during effortful behavior 
(Mulert, Menzinger, Leicht, Pogarell, & Hegerl, 2005; Walton, Kennerley, Bannerman, Phillips, & 
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Rushwortha, 2006). In the current study, we found activity in the RCZ (a region that extends 
posteriorly and dorsally from the ACC) by contrasting the free-choice condition with the cued-choice 
condition. Arguably, free-choice trials could be more effortful than forced choices, because they 
require an extra choice process. From this perspective, the RCZ would be responsible for the more 
effortful process of response selection and maintenance, while the DLPFC and the motor structures 
are responsible for implementing the choice (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). In the current study we found 
that the DLPFC and the pre-SMA did not show heightened activity during prime-response 
incompatible choices compared to prime-compatible or prime-neutral choices.  These areas might 
therefore be more involved in the execution and implementation of a chosen response than in the 
conflict resolution process. In contrast, our data suggest that RCZ and AI lie at the heart of a conflict 
resolution network, distinct from the response implementation network of DLPFC and pre-SMA.  This 
dissociation is consistent with previous studies (Seeley et al., 2007; De Pisapia et al., 2011).  In their 
terminology, RCZ and the AI are part of a salience network, while DLPFC and the pre-SMA are more 
involved in the execution of responses. Within this salience network, Seeley et al. (2007) also suggest 
a double role for the ACC and the AI. The first role is processing errors and conflicts. The second role 
is processing interoceptive feedback. On one view, the AI and RCZ monitor internal and external 
inputs and resolve conflict between competing options in order to choose the appropriate response.  
Finally it is worth mentioning that the instructions to respond in a random, yet balanced way 
on free choice trials could have caused activation in the RCZ as well. This requirement could have 
introduced constraints on the supposedly free decision, and could have resulted in the engagement 
of the complex executive task of tracking recent responses and attempting to generate a random 
sequence. Activity in the RCZ has been associated with task difficulty (Wisniewski, Reverberi, Tusche, 
& Haynes, 2015).  While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that participants used effortful 
strategies to produce random sequences, we think that it is unlikely that the RCZ activation we 
observed in the current study is driven by such strategies. First, the design mixes free choice trials 
and cued trials. This reduces the likelihood that participants use complex strategies to determine a 
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random order. Second, the important question for the current study is whether this requirement 
strongly constrains ‘free’ choices and whether this constraint interacts with priming? Looking at the 
behavioral data we found no evidence that the instruction to be random on free choices interfered 
with the task.  
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, our study has shown that the brain’s voluntary action network can indeed be 
modulated by subliminal information. We thus propose that the RCZ and the AI are involved both in 
overcoming conflict between different response alternatives during free choices, here including 
those suggested by the external environment in the form of subliminal primes. We suggest that the 
DLPFC and the pre-SMA, in contrast, are responsible for implementing and carrying out the voluntary 
response chosen after such conflicts have been resolved. 
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Highlights 

Subliminal response priming was used to bias free and cued choices 
Activation in the rostral cingulate zone was modulated by subliminal information 
RCZ plays an important role in overcoming externally-triggered response conflict 
Activity was also modulated in the anterior insula and the supramarginal gyrus 
